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I.  Introduction 
 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) recently organised a 
Workshop in the Philippines, of trade and industry officials from Asia and Pacific countries.  
The Workshop had a timely purpose: to identify trading opportunities and adjustment strategies 
to benefit from the liberalisation of world trade as well as to cope with the difficulties which 
developing countries will face in the Post-Uruguay Round World Trading System. National 
papers on the subject were presented by officials from the following countries: Brunei, 
Bangladesh, China, Fiji, HongKong, India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan Province of China, Thailand and 
Vietnam. 
 
The object of the present paper is to put these national papers as well as the new world trading 
system in their context by providing an historical and analytical overview of the main 
developments in the world economy in the Post-World War II period.  
 
II. Longterm Tendencies in the World Economy 
 
Two long-run tendencies have dominated the world economy in the post-war period, namely, 
industrialisation of developing countries (the South) and de-industrialisation (in the sense of a 
declining number or proportion of people employed in manufacturing) of the older industrial 
countries (the North).  The evolution of the relationship between these phenomena and how 
this relationship is managed by the international community will be a central issue on the world 
economic agenda well into the new millennium. We will explore here certain aspects of these 
phenomena. 
 
The paper suggests that in the second half of this century, taking advantage of the propitious 
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circumstances which opened up at the end of the second World War, the developing countries 
embarked on an industrial revolution.  Between 1950 and 1980 they made remarkable 
economic and industrial progress.  However over the last fifteen years this process has been 
interrupted in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa whilst the Asian countries have continued 
with their fast pace of industrial development.  It is argued here that it is a compelling social 
imperative for developing countries for this industrial revolution to continue.  We shall 
consider their prospects of success in the new world economic order which is emerging, and 
suggest ways in which the international community can best help in this task. 
 
III.  The Industrial Revolution of the Third World 
 
Following the end of the second world war, a large number of third world countries embarked 
on a veritable industrial revolution — a revolution that they had been prevented from 
implementing fifty or hundred years earlier by the rather different world economic and political 
conditions.  With their political independence and with the new world economic conjuncture 
that prevailed in the post-war period, most poor countries initiated a serious process of 
industrialisation and, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s, several of them made rapid 
industrial progress.  Even developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, which started with 
extremely unfavourable initial conditions when colonial rule ended, managed to increase their 
share of world manufacturing production during these two decades.   More significantly, a 
group of nations in Asia and Latin America — the so called newly industrialising countries — 
were especially successful in establishing a technical, scientific and industrial infrastructure, in 
training their labour forces and in developing a relatively broad based industrial structure.  By 
the 1970s these countries were providing formidable competition to the North in a range of 
consumer and producer goods industries (Singh, 1989). 
 
As a consequence of this industrialisation, as well as parallel transformations in agriculture and 
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in other sectors of the economy, by previous historical standards the overall economic progress 
in the developing countries after World War II was very impressive.  Thus, for example, from 
1960 to 1980, despite the fact that the population was increasing at a very high rate of nearly 
2.5% per annum, the rate of growth of per capita GDP in the developing countries was over 3% 
per annum.  This rate of material development implied a doubling of productive capacity every 
22 years or so; it also compared very favourably with the long term rate of per capita economic 
growth of about 1.3% per annum which the West European industrial countries achieved during 
the hundred years between 1850 and 1950.   
 
In statistical terms, the Third World's economic achievements of the three decades 1950-80 are 
a story without parallel in world development history. During this period, the South surpassed 
the 80-year record of the North's 19th century (1820-1900) advance. The South did this in half 
the time, at twice the growth rates and with five times the North's population in the 19th century 
(Patel, 1992).  Arguably the South achieved greater material advance during these three 
decades than it did in the previous three thousand years.
1
  
 
In addition to these economic gains, the Third World countries during this period also made 
extraordinary social advances.  To take a single, but crucial indicator, life expectancy rose from 
around 40 years in 1950 to 60 years by the mid 1980s - in other words 20 years were added to 
the life of the average citizen of the South. Life expectancy for the females increased even more 
than for males almost everywhere in the South. 
    
IV. Social Imperatives for the South's Industrial Revolution 
   
Although the South's economic performance during 1950-80 was excellent by its own previous 
                     
    
1
On this point see further Patel (1992). 
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standards, as well as by comparison with the historical record of today's developed countries, it 
was barely equal to the minimal requirements of its people. It is a social necessity for 
developing countries to grow rapidly for two overriding reasons: to provide jobs for their fast 
growing labour forces and to reduce poverty.
2
 
 
Taking the employment challenge first, despite a slow-down in  population growth in some 
countries in the recent period, labour force in Latin American and African economies has been 
expanding on average at a rate of about 3 per cent per annum.  On the basis of past 
relationships between economic variables, to create jobs at this rate in order to meet the 
employment needs of just these new entrants to the labour force, the economies of these 
countries would need to grow at a rate of about 6 per cent per annum
3
.  If the current high 
levels of unemployed and underemployed in these developing countries are also to be reduced, 
the growth rate will need to be higher still.  
 
The employment question is directly linked to that of the reduction of poverty.  At the 
microeconomic level a reasonably remunerative job will keep a family out of poverty.  At the 
macroeconomic level, the relationship between the two, even though indirect, is equally close.  
Just as the creation of sufficient employment opportunities requires a reasonable rate of 
economic growth, so does the eradication of poverty and meeting the minimum basic needs of 
the people. 
                     
    
2
 The following analysis draws on Singh and Zammit, 1995. 
    
3
 To illustrate, the rate of growth of labour force in Mexico 
is about 3% p.a. The long term trend rate of growth of productivity 
in the period 1950-80 has also been about 3% p.a. This means that 
GDP needs to grow at nearly 6% p.a. in order just to provide jobs 
for the new entrants in the labour force. Similarly, the UN Social 
Report (UN 1993) notes that since about one half of all output 
accrues to labour, developing economies will need to grow at 6% 
a year during the present decade, in order to absorb the growing 
labour force at current levels of income. 
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Although at any one time, a redistribution of national output may enable a society to better meet 
the basic needs of its people, on a longer term basis such needs can only be met if there is an 
expansion of the national economy.  Economic growth generates increased employment and 
household incomes; equally importantly, it increases government revenues, which may be spent 
on health, education, clean water supplies and other basic needs of the people. 
 
In its influential 1976 report, the ILO estimated that even allowing for some redistribution of 
incomes, if the minimum basic needs of the poorest 20 per cent of the Third World's population 
were to be met by the year 2000, their economies would have to grow at an annual average rate 
of 7 to 8 per cent a year. Co-incidently, these rates are not all that different from those required 
to create adequate employment opportunities for the South's growing population, as outlined 
above.  
 
However, past statistical relationships between industrial and overall economic growth suggest 
that at the average level of per capita income for developing countries, a one per cent increase in 
long-term economic growth is associated with about 1.5 per cent expansion in manufacturing 
value added.
4
  This suggests that if developing countries are to grow at 6 per cent or more per 
annum in order to meet the minimal basic and employment needs of their people, industry 
would have to expand at a rate of about 10 percent per annum. Hence the social necessity for the 
South's industrial revolution to continue to its completion. 
 
V.  Interruption of the Industrial Revolution in Latin America and Africa 
 
In view of these pressing basic requirements of the people in the poor countries, in December 
                     
    
4
 See further Singh (1984). 
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1980, the U.N. General Assembly adopted its resolution on the International Development 
Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade, which stated that the `average 
annual rate of growth of gross domestic product for the developing countries as a whole during 
the Decade [the 1980s] should be 7%'.
5
 This was not an unreasonable ambition for the world 
community in the light of the fact that in each successive decade after the second world war, the 
South's average growth rate had been greater than before. 
 
However, for a large number of developing countries, the actual experience of the 1980s was 
greatly at variance with this ambition.  Instead of a rise, the last decade witnessed a steep fall in 
the trend rate of growth of production in the South, to about half the rate envisaged by the U.N.
6
 
 More significantly, for the Latin American and  African nations, the 1980s were a disastrous 
decade: these countries suffered on average sizeable falls in their per capita GDP.  When the 
per capita GDP figures are adjusted appropriately for changes in the terms of trade and net 
factor payments, the results indicate that average per capita income in the Latin American 
countries was 15% and in the African countries as much as 30% lower in 1989 than in 1980 
(UN, 1990). 
 
In the collapse of overall economic growth in Latin America and Africa in this lost decade of 
the 1980s , industry fared particularly badly.  In many of these countries, instead of rising 
                     
    
5
 The UN General Assembly Resolution, 35-36 of 5 December 1980, 
para 20. 
    
6
 The rate of growth of GDP for all 'low and middle income 
economies' in the World Bank data-set fell from 5.9% p.a. during 
1965-80, to 3.2% p.a. in the period 1980-90, (see Table 1 in the 
appendix). However, as Table 1 also shows this reduced rate of growth 
in the later period is entirely an aggregation effect. It is wholly 
due to the collapse of economic growth in Latin America and 
Sub-Saharan African countries during the lost decade of the 1980s. 
As the table indicates the East Asian and South Asian countries 
recorded trend increases in their respective growth rates during 
the 1980s. 
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industrial output and employment, there was large scale deindustrialization.  Industrial 
production shrank by as much as 25 per cent in some countries.  Industrial capacity utilisation 
during the 1980s fell to 20 per cent or so in countries like Tanzania with severe adverse 
consequences for employment and real wages.  In Mexico real wages fell by more than 50 per 
cent between 1981 and 1988
7
.   
In the 1990s, as a consequence of large scale private capital flows to Latin America, there has 
been a revival of economic and industrial growth in a number of economies on that continent. 
However only one or two of them (Chile and perhaps Argentina) have so far shown signs of 
reverting back to their previous (ie. pre-debt crisis) long-term trend rates of growth.  For most 
countries in the region the prospect for the resumption of the industrial revolution and faster 
long-term economic growth have again been put into jeopardy by the recent financial crisis in 
Mexico.  The economic situation in the African countries in the 1990s is, if anything, even less 
promising. 
 
One outstanding success story for the South during the recent period has been the extremely 
good economic performance of the Asian countries, particularly those in East Asia, including 
China.  In contrast with the Latin American and African countries which suffered economic 
collapse in the 1980s, the East, but importantly also the South Asian countries either maintained 
their high previous momentum of economic growth or achieved a trend increase in it. The 
industrial revolution, which got interrupted in Africa and Latin America, has proceeded apace in 
these Asian countries, leading to substantial creation of new jobs and higher real wages as well 
as a significant reduction in poverty.
8
 
                     
    
7
 According to the ILO statistics between 1985-92 legal minimum 
wage rates fell by nearly 60% in Argentina, 33% in Brazil, 33% in 
Uruguay, 50% in El Salvador and nearly 60% again in Peru. (ILO, 
1994, page 108). 
    
8
 In China, the incidence of poverty fell from 28% of the 
population in 1980 to 10% in 1990; in Indonesia, the corresponding 
reduction was from 29% to 15%; in the Republic of Korea from 10% 
to 5%, and in Malaysia from 9% to 2%. In India, in 1978 there were 
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The above record of Third-World industrialisation and economic development during the last 
half century raises the following analytical and policy issues: 
 
 
(a)Why have the Asian countries been able to continue with their industrial revolution, whilst 
economic growth and industrial development in Latin America and sub-Saharan 
Africa came to a virtual standstill in the 1980s and into the 1990s? 
 
(b)How can the industrial revolution be revived in the Latin American and the African 
countries? 
 
(c)Will the successful Asian countries be able to continue with their industrial revolution and 
bring it to a successful completion in the new post-cold war economic order? 
 
These are all big questions and their treatment in this short essay can only be brief and 
schematic.  I shall take them up in turn below. 
 
VI. The Great Continental Divide:  Asian Economic Success and Latin American Failure 
 
The question of why Asian countries succeeded and the  Latin  American and the African 
countries failed in the 1980s and into the 1990s is of obvious intellectual interest.  However, as 
explained in Singh (1993), because of the specific analyses of this issue by the orthodox 
economists and the international financial institutions and the lessons which they draw from 
                                                                
nearly 300 million people living below the official poverty line. 
By 1990, this number had been reduced by nearly a third (The 
Economist, 15 May 1993). 
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them, it is also today of critical policy significance. The contrast between the Asian and Latin 
American economic performance in the recent period is particularly striking as in the previous 
15 years (1965-80), the two groups of economies had been growing at much the same rate, ie at 
an average rate of about 6 per cent per annum.[See table 1]. The reasons for the divergent 
economic performance of countries on these two developing continents have been examined in 
detail in two previous papers (Singh 1993 and 1994b) and I summarise below their main 
conclusions. 
 
Firstly these papers point out that what is significant about this phenomenon is not just the 
intercontinental differences in performance which have emerged in the last 15 years, but also the 
intracontinental uniformity of experience. In a detailed analysis of 9 Latin American and 9 
Asian economies, Singh (1993) showed that in the 1960s and 1970s, the median growth rates of 
the two groups were much the same.  However, in the 1980s none of the Asian countries except 
Philippines recorded a growth rate of less than 4 per cent. In sharp contrast, no Latin American 
country managed to grow at 4 per cent during that decade - only two of them (Columbia and 
Chile) achieved a growth rate of more than 3 per cent (See table 2 in the appendix). 
 
Secondly this intracontinental uniformity of economic experience is particularly surprising for 
the Asian countries since these countries not only have followed rather different economic 
policy regimes, have different political systems but also display enormous heterogeneity in their 
overall governance capacities.  China has a socialist system whilst other countries in the group 
are capitalist. Among the capitalist countries, some have had authoritarian regimes (e.g 
Indonesia) while others are more democratic (e.g India ). Moreover, countries like Korea have 
followed export-oriented policies while India has been a classic example of vigorous import 
substitution.  Yet all these countries managed to either maintain or to improve upon their 
economic performance in the 1980s, whilst the Latin American countries were afflicted with 
collective economic failure. 
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Thirdly, these papers show that contrary to the international financial institutions, the main 
reason for the intercontinental differences in economic performance were not the internal 
economic factors but external shocks arising from fundamental changes in world economic 
conditions which occurred at the end of 1970s.  These changes, heralded by the so called 
'Volcker' shock (named after the then Chairman of the US Federal Reserve), emanated from the 
adoption of highly contractionary  monetarist economic policies in the US and other leading 
OECD economies.  The new monetary and fiscal  policies led to a prolonged world economic 
recession and unprecedented high interest rates. In the non-neoclassical real world of imperfect 
wage-price flexibility, unemployment and balance of payments disequilibria, these events 
affected LDCs through four main channels: a demand shock to LDC exports; a consequent fall 
in commodity prices and a terms of trade shock; the interest rate shock; and a capital supply 
shock.
9
 
 
If all these external shocks are considered together - as indeed they should be - their combined 
size and adverse impact on the balance of payments of the Latin American economies was much 
greater than that for the Asian countries. The Latin American countries were particularly hard 
hit by the capital supply shock which is either ignored or not properly examined in the orthodox 
analyses of these issues. 
 
There are some further points which are salient with respect to the nature and consequences of 
these external shocks.  First the sheer size of the shocks: the external shocks which many Latin 
American countries suffered in the early 1980s were gigantic.  It requires an enormous 
                     
    
9
See further, Singh (1986); Dornbusch (1985).  Dornbusch 
correctly notes that in the neoclassical world of perfect wage-price 
flexibility, full employment and balance of payments equilibrium, 
only two of the external shocks mentioned in the text are relevant, 
namely the terms of trade and interest rate shocks. 
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economic and social effort as well as a considerable period of time to recover from the 
disruptions caused by such shocks. Instead, however, the effects of these shocks were 
compounded for the Latin American  and African countries by the fact that a number of the 
same adverse external factors continued to operate throughout the 1980s.  The terms of trade 
fell by nearly 20 per cent for the Latin American countries during this decade, and by nearly 30 
per cent for sub-Saharan African countries.  However, for South Asian countries and East 
Asian NICs there was a small improvement in the terms of trade over this period. More 
importantly, unlike the Asian countries, Latin American economies continued to be severely 
credit rationed for much of the decade. 
 
Singh's analysis suggests that the magnitude of the external shocks which the Latin American 
countries were subject to in the 1980s was so large, that this not only had a big impact on the 
real economy and its future growth prospects, but equally importantly, the ensuing redistributive 
struggle over reduced economic growth also greatly disturbed the normal balance of political 
forces in these societies. This in turn led to extreme financial and monetary instability and 
episodes of hyper inflation. Singh concludes that if the rich countries  such as the UK and the 
US had been afflicted with anywhere near the same kind of shocks, they would most likely have 
fared worse and probably suffered a much longer period of depression.
10
 
 
 
Nevertheless, Singh (1993) stresses that although the Latin American economic collapse in the 
1980s was due very largely to international economic forces beyond their control rather than 
                     
    
10
For a full analysis of these issues, including other alleged 
Latin American sins (eg. too large a role of the state, macroeconomic 
policy errors and microeconomic inefficiencies) see further Singh 
(1993; 1994), Fishlow (1991); Ross (1991); Banuri (1991).  For the 
orthodox perspective on these questions, see among others World 
Bank (1991); Sachs (1985); Maddison (1985) and Summers and Thomas 
(1993). 
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domestic mismanagement, these countries must improve their internal organisation and resource 
utilisation if they are to recover their longterm growth rates of 1950-1980 and to resume fully 
their industrial revolution.  
 
VII.  South's Industrial Revolution and the Cold War International Economic Order 
 
I turn now to the other two issues mentioned at the end of section IV, namely the revival of the 
interrupted industrial revolutions in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, and the question of 
the sustainability of the industrial revolution in the Asian countries in the new post-cold war 
international economy. As the two issues are related, I shall consider them together. 
 
The essential point to note here is that the outstanding economic success of the third world 
countries in the three decades 1950-80 as outlined earlier took place in extraordinarily 
favourable international conditions. The most important of these are listed below. 
 
(i)  Between 1950 and 1973, the period which has been rightly called the Golden Age
11
, there 
was an historically unprecedented expansion of production and consumption (at a rate of nearly 
5% per annum) in advanced industrial nations. Moreover, this was a long sustained period of 
virtual full employment in most of these economies. A number of countries not only enjoyed 
full employment but in fact had over-full employment - nearly 10% of the employed labour 
force in countries like France and West Germany came from abroad. During this period, there 
was an enormous expansion of world trade, and that in manufactures grew in volume terms at a 
very fast rate of nearly 10% per annum. Most developing countries also participated in and 
benefitted from this world-wide prosperity.  
 
                     
    
11
See Kindleberger (1992); Glyn, Hughes, Lipietz and Singh 
(1990). 
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(ii) Developing countries gained from the faster growth of the OECD economy through much 
the same channels by which they have been disadvantaged by the slower growth of the North 
economies in the post-1980 period. The rapid economic growth and full employment in the 
North helped the South by leading to increased demand for Southern products; by absorbing, in 
addition to Southern goods, large numbers of immigrants from the South; by lower real interest 
rates; and by the governments of the North, particularly the US, being able to afford large aid 
programmes. 
 
(iii) The post-world War II international trading system worked greatly in favour of developing 
countries.  Here was a multilateral system - the GATT - which permitted LDCs to have more or 
less free access to advanced country markets without "reciprocity".  Poor countries were 
allowed to use import controls against advanced nations to protect their infant industries.  
Similarly the articles of agreement of the IMF allowed LDCs to use exchange controls to protect 
their financial systems.  These controls were of course widely used by the poor countries. 
 
The Western international trading and financial system in the Golden Age worked smoothly and 
predictably under the guidance of a single hegemonic power, the US.  The cold war and the 
contention between the two systems worked to the advantage of the LDCs, as it did to that of 
West European countries and Japan in the early post-war period. Thus, during the Golden Age,  
whether through altruism or through national security interest, the US acted on a farsighted 
design, based on non-reciprocity. As Spero (1977) notes specifically with respect to Western 
Europe and Japan:  
 
"In the short term it (the US) dealt with its own huge balance-of-trade-surplus and the European 
and Japanese deficits by foreign aid and military expenditures.  In addition the United 
States abandoned the Bretton-Woods goal of convertibility and encouraged European 
and Japanese trade protectionism and discrimination against the dollar.  For example, 
the United States absorbed large volumes of Japanese exports while accepting Japanese 
restrictions against American exports... To encourage long term adjustment, the United 
States promoted European and Japanese trade competitiveness." (emphasis added). 
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(iv) It is no exaggeration to say that probably the most successful story of economic 
development and industrialisation for a sustained period in the entire history of mankind is that 
of Japan and other East Asian Nics during the last three or four decades. This outstanding 
economic achievement was however made possible, among other factors, not only by the free 
access of these countries to the US market, but also by their ability to pursue an active and 
vigorous export-oriented industrial policy
12
. To achieve their goals, these nations controlled the 
competitive process and used a whole panoply of export and industrial policy instruments 
without much hindrance from GATT or other international agencies. 
 
(v) During this period of contention between the US and the Soviet systems, many LDCs 
benefitted from technical and economic aid from both sides. Thus when in the early 1950s, the 
US refused to help India establish  an integrated steel plant in  the state sector, the Soviets 
immediately stepped in with the offer of an even bigger plant (at Bhilai) which was accepted. 
Later, Indian steel technicians in their thousands were trained in both the US and the Soviet 
Union. 
 
Compared with the Golden Age, developing countries, are today faced with a radically different 
situation in most respects enumerated above.  The Golden Age of simultaneous prosperity for 
the North and the South evidently came to an end with the first oil shock in 1973.
13
 Since then, 
the rate of growth of the OECD and the world GDP has nearly halved. Significantly, the 
recorded rate during the last twenty years is much more in line with the long term trend rate of 
                     
    
12
 See further Amsden (1989); Wade (1990); Chang (1993); Singh 
(1994a; 1995c). For a contrary view see World Bank (1993). 
    
13
For the South as a whole, the Golden Age lasted a few years 
longer, until 1980 - this was mainly because of large scale borrowing 
by both Asian and Latin American NICs during 1974-1980. 
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growth of industrial countries in the hundred years before the Golden Age (World Bank, 1987). 
Consequently, many industrial countries, particularly in Western Europe are witnessing mass 
unemployment, a situation which was unthinkable in the Golden Age.  
 
Double digit unemployment rates are currently being recorded by Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Italy, with near double-digit rates in several others including Britain and Germany. On the most 
recent available official data, nearly a quarter of the labour force in Spain is unemployed.
14
 
Overall, in the OECD economies there were 8 million unemployed in 1970; now there are 35 
million, 10 per cent of the labour force.  Involuntary part- or short-time workers and 
discouraged job seekers could increase these figures by 50 per cent.  Although the US, unlike 
the European economies, has not suffered a trend rise in unemployment since 1970, real wages 
in that country have not increased for the last 20 years. 
 
Workers, trade unionists and the general public in industrial countries increasingly blame cheap 
labour products from developing economies for these job losses or for stagnating real wages.  
So, unlike the 1950s and 1960s, when free trade with advanced countries was feared by 
developing countries, today it is the former who are more concerned about the ill effects of a 
liberal trading regime.  These concerns were epitomised by Ross Perot and Pat Choate in their 
condemnation of the North American Free Trade Agreement with Mexico as "a drastic and 
unfair scheme...(which) will pit American and Mexican workers in a race to the bottom".  
Hence in many advanced countries there are populist demands for protection from Third World 
imports.  These often take the form of asking for the imposition of labour or environmental 
standards on Third World products.
15
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 The source of these data is IMF, 1995. 
    
15
See further Singh (1995a). 
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Moreover in view of its chronic trade and current account deficits, the US is now demanding 
reciprocity from its trading partners, even from poor countries.  In the context of this emphasis 
on reciprocity, notwithstanding the concessions on the MFA,  the Uruguay Round, from a 
Southern perspective, therefore represents a significant retrogression even in relation to trade in 
manufacturing.  Moreover, it is conceivable that many of the export promotion and industrial 
policy measures used by Japan and the East Asian Nics in the past may no longer be 
permissable under the new WTO rules.  Similarly, in the post-cold-war era, the Western 
industrial countries do not have to worry about providing competitive aid to LDCs to keep them 
in the Western Camp. 
 
 
 
VIII.  The International Economy and the Resumption of the South's Industrial 
Revolution 
 
Notwithstanding reciprocity and other restrictions on the freedom of manoeuvre of the LDCs 
which the post-cold-war order imposes, it is evident from the foregoing analysis that the 
prospects for the resumption of the industrial revolution in Latin America and sub-Saharan 
Africa and its continuation in Asia, will be greatly enhanced if there was full employment in 
industrial countries and their economies were growing fast. In addition to the advantages 
mentioned earlier which faster OECD growth will bring to LDCs, there are two other important 
considerations which point in the same direction. 
 
First, the post-world war II history of the world economy suggests that the competitive game, 
not only between the North and the South, but among nation states in general is played in a 
cooperative, non- zero-sum manner only when the world economy is growing fast and there is 
more or less full employment in the leading countries. However, when there is widespread 
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unemployment in these economies and the world economy is expanding slowly (the situation 
to-day), instead of international cooperation, the outcome is likely to be conflict and a retreat 
into non-zero-sum ad hoc protectionism.  
 
Secondly, with respect to the question of 'aid fatigue' in industrial countries, two points are 
relevant. First, faster economic growth and hence healthier public finances may make the rich 
countries more generous. Secondly, and more importantly, faster OECD growth may lead to a 
sufficient improvement in the LDC terms of trade to compensate for the reduced aid flows. As 
Maizels (1995) has noted, by 1990 real commodity prices had fallen to 45% below the 1980 
level, equivalent to 10% below the level of 1932, the bottom of the inter-war depression. He 
estimates that between 1980 and 1991 the cumulative loss to LDCs attributable to the fall in real 
commodity prices to be $290 billion, or some $25 billion per year on average. He notes that the 
annual rate of loss rose sharply from $5 billion in the first half of the 1980s to almost $55 billion 
in 1989-1991; the latter exceeded the total of all official development assistance to developing 
countries. Although commodity prices have risen over the last year, they are still substantially 
below their 1980 level in real terms.  
 
What then are the prospects for restoring full employment in industrial countries and enhancing 
their economic growth under the new post-cold war international economic order?  It is 
important to appreciate that in broad terms, this order is a continuation of the Reagan/Thatcher 
model of market supremacy which industrial countries have progressively instituted since 1980 
both internally within their own economies (as exemplified by the emphasis on privatisation, 
'deregulation' and labour market flexibility), and externally in the international economy 
(encompassing free movement of goods, services and capital flows, but significantly not 
labour).  
 
Economic analysis and available evidence indicates that this market supremacy model is 
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unlikely to be able to restore anywhere near full employment in the OECD economy, or to lead 
to a significant trend increase in its rate of growth (see further, Singh 1995b; UNCTAD 1993 
and 1994; ILO 1995). It is useful to observe that the world economy has been far more closely 
integrated in the post- 1980 period than it was in the Golden Age, yet its trend growth rate since 
1980 has been half of what it was in the Golden Age.  Greater economic integration, the 
Bretton Woods institutions contend, leads to more efficient resource utilization and fast 
economic growth.  Clearly, this has not happened. Moreover the OECD economy under the 
market supremacy model has not only been characterised by much lower trend growth rate, but 
also compared with the Golden Age it has  been far more unstable. Last, but not least, as 
outlined earlier, there is mass unemployment today, whilst there was full employment just 
twenty years or so ago. Let us just recall again that between 1965 and 1973 the rate of 
unemployment in West Germany averaged only 0.79% of the labour force compared with a 
corresponding figure of over 6% during 1983-92 (Eatwell, 1995). 
 
The central issue for the world community is whether such a dynamic period associated with 
fuller employment can be re-created.  This hinges on understanding how this Golden Age of 
plenty of jobs and fast economic growth for an extended period of nearly a quarter of a century 
occurred and why it ended. The answers to these large and important questions may be 
summarised as follows:
16
 
 
1.  In essence, the Golden Age  was the outcome of a unique economic regime -- a new 
development model -- which was very different from that prevailing in the inter-war period, and 
also from the one which has been instituted in the last decade and a half. 
 
2. In purely descriptive macro-economic terms, the Golden Age was characterised by two 
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important relations: (a) rapid growth of productivity and capital stock per worker; and (b) fast 
growth of both real wages and productivity. The significance of these two relations is that they 
guarantee both a roughly constant profit rate and roughly equal growth of consumption and 
production, thus ratifying and maintaining the initial rate of accumulation.  However, such a 
macro-economic growth path could only be perpetuated if it were compatible with the 
behaviour of individual economic agents - firms, workers, consumers. This compatibility in the 
Golden Age was insured by a social consensus around generally cooperative institutional 
arrangements in respect of setting of wages and prices, the distribution between wages and 
profits, and the state fiscal, credit and welfare policies which guaranteed minimum living 
standards and maintained aggregate demand. Similarly, at the international level, under the 
leadership of a singe hegemonic power for much of this period, the US, the global economic 
system functioned under stable monetary and trading arrangements.   
 
3. The process of the erosion of the Golden Age began well before the oil price shock of 
1973.  Serious difficulties arose at the levels of both the national and the international 
regulatory regimes;  these began to interact with each other in a cumulatively adverse way to 
the detriment of the system as a whole.  The Bretton Woods monetary system broke down in 
the late 1960s, partly as a consequence of the success of the Golden Age itself - the rise of the 
Japanese, the West German and other European countries in the international market place led 
to serious balance of payments problems for  the US, hitherto the lynch pin of the international 
system.  There is also evidence of a productivity slow-down by the late 1960s in several leading 
industrial countries, which was not matched by a deceleration in the rate of growth of real 
wages, thus leading to a profit squeeze. 
 
4. Thus, the demise of the Golden Age was in fact due to events overtaking the existing 
institutional framework. For the Golden Age to have continued, the system required some of the 
existing institutions to adapt to the new situation. But it also needed the building of fresh 
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institutions. 
 
Turning to the current situation, the reduction of mass unemployment in the North requires a 
trend increase in the rate of growth of demand and output in the OECD countries.  However, 
this cannot be achieved simply by changes in the fiscal and monetary policies of the leading 
industrial countries. Past evidence would suggest that, in the absence of an appropriate 
restraining institutional framework at the national and international levels, reliance on such 
policies would simply result in an excessively sharp rise in commodity prices (as occurred in the 
early 1970s), an increase in trade union militancy and higher inflation, which in turn would 
thwart the expansionary process.  Instead of the post 1980 market supremacy model, the  
restoration of full employment with only moderate inflation requires  more co-operative 
institutional arrangements involving workers, employers and governments in individual 
countries.  It will also require more co-operative relationships between nation states, within the 
North (to achieve inter alia macro-economic policy coordination) and between North and South 
(in order to obtain particularly, more orderly but more remunerative movements in commodity 
prices.)
17
  
 
IX. Conclusion 
 
This essay has argued that despite the difficulties created for developing countries by the new 
international economic order, it is a social imperative for these developing countries to continue 
with and to complete their industrial revolutions. The social necessity arises from two 
fundamental requirements: (a)  the need to create jobs for the South's rapidly growing labour 
force, and (b) to meet the minimal basic needs of the people over a reasonable time span. The 
paper suggests that there is a common purpose between the continuation of the South's 
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industrial revolution and the elimination of current mass unemployment in the North, which is 
also a social imperative. The prospect of achieving both these objectives will be greatly 
enhanced by faster economic growth in the North. This will require a fresh strategy based on 
co-operation at both the national and the international levels. It was this kind of strategy which 
gave the world - the North as well as the South - unprecedented prosperity during the third 
quarter of this century. 
 
The necessary work of institution building and institutional innovation and renewal, nationally 
and internationally, for achieving permanent full employment in market economies and for 
continuing and completing the South's industrial revolution, is  certainly challenging, but not 
impossible. The UN and its agencies, for example the ILO and the UNCTAD, are ideally 
equipped to assist in this endeavour. 
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Table 1: Trends in GDP growth in the South, 1965-80 and 1980-90, 
               (average annual % growth) 
 
Country group   
 1965-80 1980-90 
Low-income economies (excluding 
China & India) 
4.8 3.9 
Middle-income economies 6.3 2.5 
Latin America 6.0 1.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.2 2.1 
South Asia (including. India) 3.6 5.2 
East Asia (including China) 7.3 7.8 
All Low and Middle income 
economies 
5.9 3.2 
 
Source: World Bank, 1992 
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GDP Growth rate in selected Asian and Latin American countries (% per year)  
 
 1960-70 1970-80 1980-90  
Asia 
 China  5.2  5.8  9.5 
 India  3.4  3.6  5.3 
 Indonesia  3.9  7.6  5.5 
 Korea  8.6  9.5  9.7 
 Malaysia  6.5  7.8  5.2 
 Pakistan  6.7  4.7  6.3 
 Philippines  5.1  6.3  0.9 
 Sri Lanka  4.6  4.1  4.0 
 Taiwan  ...  ...  ... 
 Thailand  8.4  7.2  7.6 
 
Median  5.2  6.3  5.3 
 
Latin America 
 Argentina  4.2  2.2 -0.4 
 Bolivia  5.2  4.8 -0.1 
 Brazil  5.4  8.4  2.7 
 Chile  4.5  2.8  3.2 
 Colombia  5.1  5.9  3.7 
 Ecuador  ...  8.8  2.0 
 Mexico  7.2  5.2  1.0 
 Peru  4.9  3.0 -0.3 
 Venezuela  6.0  5.0  1.0 
 
Median  5.1  5.0  1.0  
 
Source: World Bank, 1989 and 1992. 
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